The Clinton-Yeltsin Moscow Summit, January 1994
Jan 14, 1994
Source: U.S. Department of State, National Security Archive FOIA
Turning to the security agenda, Yeltsin tells Clinton that his information about arms sales to Iran is incorrect and asks him if sanctions on Iraq could be eased so that Russia could collect some of the debt that Iraq still owed it. Clinton noted that if Iraq was permitted to sell oil, the falling oil prices would harm Russian interests. Defense Minister Grachev talks about military-to-military relations, his recent meetings with U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin, and his first call on the Partnership for Peace hotline on January 5, 1995. He wants to meet with the new U.S. Defense Secretary as soon as possible (retired Admiral Bobby Inman had been nominated by Clinton to succeed Aspin but later withdrew) and to brief the Secretary General of NATO on the new Russian military doctrine. Grachev is very pleased with the close cooperation with the U.S. military and even invites Clinton and Yeltsin to personally observe a planned bilateral military exercise in July 1994.
One of most important issues for the U.S. team, according to the scene-setter, is the deployment of Russian peace-keeping forces in the near abroad. This issue is painful for Yeltsin, who is trying to be a force for good in the former Soviet space. The Russian president talks about Russia’s constructive actions in Moldova and Georgia and his desire to stop bloodshed. He says that “allegations of imperial aspirations are harming us and are not correct.”
Yeltsin wants to speak about his favorite subject—U.S.-Russian partnership, and Russia’s relationship with NATO. In his memoir, Kozyrev wrote that Yeltsin was shocked by Clinton’s “not whether but when” statement in Prague about future NATO expansion, and even felt betrayed by Clinton. Here, however, Yeltsin says to Clinton “we certainly agree with you on NATO” but also states that“Russia has to be the first country to join NATO,” followed by other states from Central and Eastern Europe. He even proposes “a kind of cartel of the U.S., Russia and Europeans to help to ensure and improve world security.” Clinton’s response is very careful, mentioning Russian’s sense of greatness but not engaging on the idea of a cartel or Russia’s membership in NATO.
The Russian president expresses his deep appreciation of Clinton: “You come to Russia not to confront us, but with the affection and love of our people and with a sense of support for Russia.” In response, Clinton talks about their “relationship of trust and confidence” and the unique chance it creates if Russia stays the course: “we could guarantee the countries of Europe a century of peace or more.” Such were the high hopes of the 1990s.
Meanwhile . . .
Talbott dismisses Kozyrev’s Peace Proposal 1994
Jan 12, 1994
Source: U.S. Department of State, National Security Archive FOIA
In this memo to the national security adviser on the eve of Clinton’s visit to Moscow, Talbott previews some of the most important issues the Russia side wants to raise during the summit—the future security arrangements in Europe. Talbott writes quite dismissively and negatively about a new European security initiative that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev presented in a German newspaper, which he called the “Partnership for United Europe.” The plan would subordinate NATO to the CSCE structures and strengthen the Russian role in building a new integrated Europe. Although the Clinton team stated publicly that a fully integrated Europe without new dividing lines was their goal, Talbott dismisses Kozyrev’s thoughts on Russian desire to “be the architect […] along with the U.S. of a completely new European security order,” saying that “it sticks in their craw that NATO appears poised to dictate the terms of the new order.”
Talbott’s early relationship with Kozyrev had been cordial and productive, but now his view of Kozyrev has changed completely. He sees the Russian foreign minister moving in a more nationalist direction partly as a result of the December elections and his own political interests. Talbott concludes that “Kozyrev has become part of the problem rather than part of the solution” and suspects that he was an unhelpful influence on Yeltsin during the last weeks of the trilateral process.
(h/t to Nicolai Petro for brining this to our attn.)