Russia’s presidential election this past week offers a new opportunity for Western politicians and journalists to castigate the Putin regime. The occasion prompted an improvised litmus test for Western leaders and governments on whether they should offer congratulations to the Russian president. To the delight of President Trump’s detractors, he apparently defied his security briefing by deliberately failing the test. By doing so, the US president, it is said, is complicit in lending support to Russia’s sham exercise in democracy. But what really is the meaning of Putin’s re-election in the Russian political context and what should be an appropriate Western response?
To begin, political elections in authoritarian regimes, such as Russia’s, do not play the same role as in consolidated democracies. They are not a contest between organized political parties, representing alternative interests and ideas, for control of national policymaking. But they often are more than a narcissistic exercise in self-deceit. The Russian presidential election is more like a referendum, in which people have a chance to support or oppose Putin. They may oppose either by voting for a rival or not voting at all. This is why the regime puts such effort into mobilizing turnout. They want everyone who supports the president to demonstrate such by coming out to vote, because non-participation may be construed as passive opposition. In this regard, the election has utility and meaning for both the ruling elite and popular electorate.
For the ruling elite, the election is a barometer of the mood of society. It a way to gauge the depths of support and dissent toward the political status quo. In addition, the election is a check on regional and local elites. It helps the leadership identify which people are most dissatisfied and which regional/local elites are doing their job most effectively. Counter-wise, the election is an opportunity for regional/local elites to show off to the leadership. High levels of turnout and support are an indication that all is well in their jurisdiction. Finally, the election may serve as a convenient opportunity for the president to change policy course or make personnel changes.
For the popular electorate, an election serves as a referendum, or at least an opinion survey, on the political status quo. A presidential election, in particular, is a chance to show thumbs up or down to the leader and their handling of current affairs. More so, it provides a means to engage in the nation’s political life, which is mostly dominated by exclusive within-system elites. In this regard, the election is a form of participation, albeit with limited influence. While very few voters do not know beforehand that Putin will win the election, participating in the process is still a worthwhile exercise. Perhaps not for direct influence on the outcome of this election, but there will be future elections whose outcomes mat not be foreordained. On this point, the election plays a legitimating role as political ritual for the Russian state in general and for the president in particular.
The political economy that holds up the Putin regime is a fragile one. The election results reflect this situation. The high percentage by which the incumbent bested the official contenders and the high turnout figures officially reported are meant to bolster the president’s political status in his dual roles as machine boss and tsar protector. From above, Putin holds sway over Russia’s rapacious elite factions and mediates inter-elite competition over the spoils of power and wealth. From below, the Putin regime does not offer democracy, but stability. It does not offer prosperity, but security. It does not offer international comity on the West’s terms, but an independent Russia that will not be dictated to by the West (USA). After two decades of recurring political crisis, economic collapse, and global decline – these lesser accomplishments are recognized by a population that knows firsthand that things could be worse.
It is easy to be smug about Putin’s Russia. But only a tiny minority of the electorate believe that the West has better solutions for what ails the country. Putin is genuinely the first choice for president of the majority of Russian voters. But going forward, it will be difficult to hold together this fragile political economy. Whoever comes next will have a most difficult challenge to reform the present system, without risking yet another round of political-economic crisis. If this is his last term, Putin’s authority should begin to erode as a covert succession struggle unfolds among contending elite factions. The overwhelming vote of support for Putin in the election is meant to forestall this development.
So how should foreign governments respond to Putin’s re-election? If one recognizes the election for what it is in the Russian political context, then it could be seen as an opportunity. Putin’s post-election remarks indicated openness to dialogue with the regime’s domestic and foreign antagonists. It could just be talk. Certainly, the actions of the regime at home and abroad in the recent past do not suggest that we are about to see its humane face revealed.
But rather than consider that possibility, political and bureaucratic forces in the UK and US were quick to squash it via a self-made controversy about acknowledging Putin’s victory. It is wrong to congratulate Putin, it goes, because Russia is not a real democracy. Instead, the West should unite and snub Putin, and maintain the present foreign policy course of renewed Cold War. Ironically, this present course is one of the principal reasons why Putin is so popular with the Russian electorate.
Not all Western leaders, however, saw the Russian election as an opportunity to rebuke Putin. Besides President Trump, German Chancellor Merkel and EU Commissioner Juncker, no Putin toadies they, politely extended congratulations to the Russian president and expressed hope that in the new term they might cooperate on issues that at present divide Russia and the West. It seems a more mature, responsible, and statesmanlike response.
Gerald Easter is a Professor of Political Science and Russian Studies specialist at Boston College