American Committee for US-Russia Accord

NATO is scrambling to fortify a windswept Baltic island that military planners increasingly see as one of the alliance’s most exposed — and strategically vital — front lines against Russia.

Some Russia–Ukraine war specialists I spoke to questioned Mendel’s reliability because of her falling out with Zelensky, because she was no longer in office, because of her history of making lurid claims, and because of the vagueness and innuendo in the Carlson interview. Others found her testimony credible and consistent with the known facts. Either way, it is important to distinguish—as Mendel often did—between what she heard first-hand and what she heard from others.

Kuznick and Hughes discuss the NPT review conference, nuclear deterrence, first strike thinking, Trump and launch power, pressure for more states to seek nuclear weapons, the role of US allies in the Gulf, Europe, and Japan, and the small but real hope offered by the nuclear ban treaty and public action.

The warning from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to the U.S. and European governments to evacuate their diplomats and citizens from Kyiv before Russia launches “systematic strikes” marks a drastic escalation in the Ukraine conflict — with a serious risk of drawing the Washington and NATO into direct conflict with Russia.

Not so long ago, there was a time when meetings of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels focused overwhelmingly on external dangers confronting the alliance. Yet throughout his second presidency, Donald Trump’s long-running frustration with Europe has raised questions not merely about policy, but about NATO’s future itself.

The Baltic States and the neighboring Russian exclave of Kaliningrad are widely regarded as the most dangerous potential flashpoint for a direct war between NATO and Russia; partly for genuine strategic reasons, and partly because of the intense paranoia at work on both sides.

Two Russian jets have “repeatedly and dangerously” intercepted a British Royal Air Force surveillance aircraft in April over the Black Sea, according to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence.

The war in Ukraine has been defined by periodic bursts of certainty that Russiais on the back foot, if not close to collapse, and that Ukraine, conversely, is inches away from victory. We appear to be in the middle of one of these moments of euphoria now.

Washington and Moscow both enthusiastically celebrated the victory of the Allied “Grand Alliance” over the fascist powers at the end of World War II.  Since then, however, the two capitals have typically been on opposite sides of numerous nasty geostrategic struggles around the world.  They also have relished opportunities to work with foreign countries and political movements to create major headaches for the other great power.

After more than five years as president, and another four years in between terms contemplating his agenda if reelected, the president has merely announced the transfer of 5,000 personnel. All the while launching multiple aggressive military actions and pushing the largest military buildup in American history.

The true total of US national security spending in 2027 will exceed $2.5 trillion, far beyond the already record-shattering $1.5 trillion military budget President Trump has requested, according to veteran defense analyst Winslow Wheeler.

The United States is poised to maintain a favorable position in a multipolar world. The legacy institutions of international liberalism have largely lost their purpose, but retain residual power (which, ironically, the U.S. can leverage most effectively against other members of the “liberal order”).

An explosive new poll suggests that a majority of Ukrainians feel their future is more threatened by corruption in the government than by Russian military aggression.

The New York Times columnist depicts Ukraine as belonging in the ranks of the world’s great powers on pragmatic as well as ethical considerations. That is true militarily, in French’s view, not only because of Ukraine’s surprising tenacity in the face of Moscow’s brutal aggression, but because of the country’s tangible achievements in drone warfare and because it might possess “the largest and most battle-hardened land force in the Western world.”

I have said for a long time that the war in Ukraine will continue into 2027. Without a major rethink of policy on the European side, which currently appears extremely unlikely, or without a significant military escalation from the Russian side, which is possibly more likely, the war could in fact run on much longer than that.

What is it that has catapulted this 46-year-old blogger, TV host, participant in entertainment shows, and figure from high-society dramas to national fame?

In the established Western imagination, the Winter War of 1939–1940 occupies an honoured place as a moral fable: the small, plucky democracy resisting a totalitarian colossus, vindicated by skis, sniper rifles, and superior pluck. Today, with Kiev exhausted and Western capitals scouring history for usable analogies, the Finnish example is invoked with the regularity of a metronome. Resist Russia, the moral of the story runs, and the bear retreats.

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday said he thinks the war with Ukraine could end soon.

“I think that the matter ⁠is coming to an end,” Putin told reporters, according to Reuters.