eastwestaccord

We, the undersigned from around the world, think the timing is propitious for calling an emergency international summit to address major conflicts in the world and the need for stepping away from the nuclear precipice.

President Biden apparently asked Russia’s Vladimir Putin for “an urgent meeting of emissaries,” and in November 2022 our spy chiefs met. The Russian spy chief “apparently thought the CIA director had been sent to negotiate…[to] end the war,” reported The New York Times. “It took some time for Mr. Burns to disabuse Mr. Naryshkin of the idea that the United States was ready [to talk peace terms].”

The Kremlin said Wednesday that CIA Director John Ratcliffe held talks in Moscow with his intelligence counterparts, a rare and secretive visit at a time when relations with Washington remain strained over Russia’s war in Ukraine.

For the last several months, relations between Ukraine and Poland — one of Ukraine’s main supporters in its war with Russia — have been unusually strained.

The trigger for renewed mutual recriminations was the decision in June by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to name a Ukrainian military unit after the “Heroes of the UPA,” which was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the armed wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) during WWII.

The question that concerns everyone is: when will the war end?

If I had an answer to that question, I’d be doing something else. We don’t have the data to say the end of the war is in sight. We know from the history of similar wars how they are resolved: negotiations begin, the parties talk, not about escalation, but about a peaceful future. Or when there are signs of complete exhaustion of one or both sides. So far, there are no such markers for the end of this war.

So, are we in a situation where neither side demonstrates a desire to end this war?

You could say that. And you could even add that we are in an escalatory spiral, with the level of violence on both sides increasing. The level of violence we are seeing now is different from what we saw just six months ago. This applies to the rear of both sides, deep strikes – both Ukrainian and Russian. And war at sea, which has been virtually non-existent for four years. Civilian shipping in the Black Sea, which used to account for about 60% of Ukrainian exports, is practically non-existent. There was an unwritten ceasefire since the grain deal, but now it’s completely broken.

How would you assess the current situation on the battlefield?

The overall situation on the battlefield hasn’t changed strategically for the past nine to twelve months. Russian troops are slowly advancing, especially in their main political direction —the Donetsk region. But the casualty rate is extremely high. And we simply don’t know how long Russia’s reserves will last, in order for this to continue.

How has the development of drones changed the theatre of military action? And who is more successful in using drones?

The battlefield has become completely transparent. The advancement of equipment is a thing of the past. We see small groups infiltrating a populated area. Drone warfare creates a huge kill zone, which is very dangerous to advance into. But when it comes to who is more innovative in these technologies, Ukraine certainly has many advantages in this regard. Their military-industrial complex has a much more start-up-like spirit than the Russian one. But Russia, of course, has much greater industrial capabilities. We also see innovations from the Russian side. When Ukraine makes a tactical move that improves its position, we see a Russian response, and we even see innovations from the Russian side that outpace the Ukrainians. The most striking example is the fibre-optic UAV. This technology was first developed by the Ukrainian side, but was later adopted and scaled up by the Russian military.

— What other innovations have Russia developed? Would jet-propelled Shaheds be among them?

— Yes. Russia now certainly has much more advanced technology than the first generation of Shaheds, which appeared in 2022. Furthermore, Russia has made progress in countering Ukrainian electronic warfare systems. The engineering capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex cannot be underestimated. Of course, there is a difference in the speed of implementation of new technologies. On the Ukrainian side, there are many decision-making opportunities, if not at the battalion level, then at the brigade level. They have freedom of action in this regard, which cannot be said of Russian brigade commanders.

Is this because of the bureaucratic Russian system?

— Yes. Or because of the spirit of Ukrainian Atamanism. Ukraine has a much more decentralised system than Russia. Individual units have the opportunity to make decisions, test new technologies, and even develop their own technologies.

Do Ukraine or Russia have any visible potential to change the situation on the battlefield? Is this possible today, and how?

If one of the sides were to make a technological breakthrough in countering UAVs, it could probably be decisive. But such a breakthrough has not yet been achieved by either side. There are some improvements in countering these weapons, but not to a qualitative level. For example, if a laser were developed that could instantly neutralize all UAVs in a specific area, it would certainly have a significant impact on the course of military operations. But such technology does not yet exist.

Has this technological race influenced Europe, the US, and other players, including China, in terms of developing drone technology?

Of course. This is the most technologically advanced war in history. Both Russia and Ukraine are closely monitoring it, and they are trying to learn lessons in terms of doctrine and new technologies. Of course, there are barriers to mastering Ukrainian developments; Ukraine uses a lot of Chinese components in its UAVs, so they can’t simply buy them up and use them, for example, in the US military. But both armies now have the most extensive experience in the world in using UAVs and countering UAVs.

How do you assess the potential of both sides—Russia and Ukraine? Is there a way of measuring it?

Everyone is worried about autumn mobilisation in Russia. It’s a kind of “X” factor. We don’t know whether Putin will decide to reinforce his troops or not.

Let’s assume mobilisation does occur. Given the development of drone technology, could the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops turn the tide?

Doubtful. Hence I believe mobilisation is unlikely. I don’t see any military sense. Especially when the recruitment of contract soldiers, while not at the same pace as in 2023 or 2024, still continues unabated. I don’t see an urgent need for mobilisation. The political consequences would be very significant.

The two sides are escalating: deep strikes, intense attacks, naval warfare. Is there still room for escalation? And has the question of Russia using nuclear weapons been removed from the agenda?

There are some possibilities. Not many, but they do exist. We will likely see a winter campaign of deep Russian strikes against the Ukrainian energy sector, which could be much more powerful than last year. Or Russia could focus on attacks on water supplies and sanitation, which was not the case last year.

So far, we haven’t seen government buildings targeted with the same intensity as, for example, military-industrial complexes on both sides. There have been no visible attempts to target decision-making centres. Such things are conceivable.

Also—and we are already seeing this—Russia is attempting to prevent Ukraine’s allies and partners from providing assistance to Kyiv or to undermine the consensus within Europe on continuing aid to Ukraine. This could be more intense than it is now. We have already seen assassination attempts on the head of Rheinmetall in Germany.

We could see an even greater focus on facilities essential for civilian life. This is already happening with retailers and distributors on both sides.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, that’s a completely different category. The Russian leadership knows this would completely change the perception of third countries, and, given NATO retaliation, could indeed change the course of history. But we have little data on this matter; there isn’t a single instance of Russia using nuclear weapons. We always return to the fall of 2022. The American press reported, and officials in the former Biden administration confirmed, that they had information that the Russian military leadership discussed the use of nuclear weapons when the front was crumbling and it was unclear whether Ukrainian troops would be able to cross the Dnieper and continue their offensive to Crimea. This was a tense moment on the battlefield. The situation is completely different now. Judging by this episode, there is no particular reason to fear the use of nuclear weapons now. In other words, this is again a matter of military logic and military necessity. So far, we see no such signs of a collapse in the Russian military.

You mentioned Russia’s possible escalation of hybrid operations in Europe. What do you classify as such hybrid operations, other than the assassination attempt on the head of Rheinmetall?

For example, the parcel incident in Germany in 2024. It nearly resulted in the downing of an aircraft. There was also that incident in Leipzig recently. There were terrorist attacks in the Baltic states—in Lithuania, when they set fire to an Ikea. We would classify all of these as hybrid operations. But that’s completely different from overt aggression against specific NATO member countries, which hasn’t happened yet.

This year, there’s been a lot of talk about the war possibly spreading beyond Ukraine, that Putin could perhaps open a Baltic front.

I wouldn’t rule out such a horizontal escalation, as they call it in political science, which would expand the geography and the number of parties to the conflict. This was a realistic scenario from the very beginning, but I don’t yet see any signs of preparation for a ground operation against Russia’s neighbours. That doesn’t mean something less overt couldn’t happen. Let’s say a missile hit a base in Poland, where military aid to Ukraine is being sent, and Russia said it was done in self-defence. That’s also a possibility. But again, the risks are very high, and so far we haven’t seen a willingness to take such risks.

Of course, it was negligence of the highest order when 20 UAVs accidentally ended up on Polish territory last fall. Or what’s happening on the Romanian-Ukrainian border. It’s safe to say that the Russian side isn’t taking sufficient measures to avoid such situations. Perhaps they’re deliberately resorting to such provocations to influence political decisions within Europe.

That was precisely my question: was it negligence or a deliberate testing of boundaries and reactions?

In the case of Poland, it was during a massive attack that was carried out through Belarus. Either negligence or the effective operation of the Ukrainian electronic warfare system. We don’t know. But what’s happening in Romania looks more like a test or a provocation, meant to remind us of the risks that countries that help Ukraine take every day.

Will the European Union continue to support Ukraine?

For now, there’s consensus to continue financial assistance. And the military component, other than funding the Ukrainian Armed Forces, isn’t that important for the current phase of the war. Ukraine primarily uses domestic military-industrial complex designs, not imported equipment.

So, it’s important for Ukraine to receive funding to produce its own weapons, not to supply them with ready-made weapons?

Yes. And to replenish the budget, because 50% of the state budget comes from external sources.

How important is American aid for Ukraine now?

There’s no financial aid at the moment. The US has completely abandoned direct financial assistance. There are specific energy projects, and the US continues to sell its weapons to Europeans, who then donate them to Ukraine. Missile defense, and especially the Patriot system, should be mentioned here. This all depends on the US’s will. Even if the system belongs to a European country, US permission is required to transfer it to Ukraine. The shortage of the most advanced Patriot systems is the most sensitive issue for Ukraine right now. The issue isn’t whether the US wants to continue providing assistance. A huge number of these interceptor missiles were used during the Iran War. There simply aren’t enough of them even for the needs of the American military.

Have Ukraine and the US negotiations on licensing the production of interceptor missiles come to nothing?

This isn’t a short-term issue. Nothing will happen this winter.

It’s years?

Yes.

There’s information that Special Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner are planning to visit Kyiv and then Moscow.

These are all TASS sources for now. It can’t be ruled out, of course. The prolonged pause in negotiations is a consequence of the Iran war and the decision-making system that has developed under this administration, where very few people participate in American foreign policy on sensitive issues like negotiations with Iran or negotiations with Russia and Ukraine.

We need a continuous process, we need the full attention of mediators, and we need to focus on the core issues that divide the parties. We haven’t seen such efforts yet. It’s unlikely that one trip will resolve anything.

In your recent publication, you noted the need to engage in diplomacy. Speaking of Washington: has Trump lost his desire to establish peace in Ukraine? Has he had enough?

No, in the abstract, of course he wants to, the desire is there. But he handed this issue over to Kushner and Witkoff. And they’re busy with other things. But this can’t be a hobby or just one of a handful of wars a person is authorised to resolve. You need a permanent negotiator, a permanent mediator who works on the details, who knows both countries and understands the nuances and political realities. Assume that Kushner and Witkoff are very competent negotiators. But they’re not devoting their full attention to the Ukraine issue.

How can one describe the current positions of Moscow, Kyiv, Washington, and Brussels regarding ending the war? Let’s start with Washington.

For Washington, the details are secondary. The most important thing is ending the war on a solid foundation. Everything else is of little importance to this administration. The details are much more important for Europe, and that’s a different matter.

There have been changes in the Ukrainian position over the past two years. From the 1991 borders to a ceasefire along the current front line. These are, of course, major changes.

And there have been certain changes on the Russian side. We haven’t heard demands to completely seize Kherson and Zaporozhe since last summer.

But we’re in the dark. When there’s no negotiation process, neither side has any incentive to show all their cards. When there’s no bargaining, there’s no need to publicly compromise. All we can do is watch public statements, which may not reflect the positions the parties are willing to take during the negotiation process.

To what extent is each side hostage to the domestic political situation? There’s Putin, who said he wants Zaporozhe and Kherson. If he doesn’t get them, does he have problems?

So far, he’s not being criticized. If he had given up on Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, then maybe there would have been some response from the Z-bloggers and the patriotic public. For Zelensky, it’s a much more difficult situation. As we saw with the dismissal of Fedorov, the Minister of Defense, he has to compromise.

It’s always difficult to compromise with an enemy from a domestic political perspective because you’re immediately accused of betrayal and treason. For Zelensky this is a more sensitive issue. But Putin isn’t operating in a vacuum either.

How do you understand Europe’s interests and position in this conflict? What would the European Union want?

“Wanted” is one thing. Of course, they’d like for this war to never happen. And for Russia to completely withdraw from Ukraine. Probably everyone except the Russian leadership would like this. But when it comes to Europe’s position now, there isn’t one. There isn’t one formulated at the level of the European Union or even a separate group of countries other than the EU3, which in early June called for immediate negotiations, an immediate ceasefire, and Europe’s participation in these negotiations. Different European states have different positions. Reaching a consensus is virtually impossible. It’s difficult for them to state any details because it immediately becomes a source of internal dispute.

Does it make sense now to discuss what a new security system in Europe might look like after the war?

I wouldn’t talk about a new security system or architecture that assumes the inclusiveness of all players. There will be a long period of confrontation between Russia and the West. The question is how to prevent this confrontation from escalating, so that the parties can communicate on a regular basis, so that we avoid direct conflict. I have no hope for anything more than this rather unpleasant stability.

— So, if this hot war stops, the world will face a cold war?

— Yes, the Cold War of the 1970s and 1980s, not the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s. These were different Cold Wars. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, there were agreements on European security. While the Cold War continued, it was truly very cold. But would be much better than what we have now.

Ordinary Europeans who move to Russia are still welcomed. But European governments, media and political classes are regarded as existential enemies.

Martyanov argues this shift is irreversible. Daily elite Russophobia, open Western celebration of Ukrainian nationalism with neo-Nazi elements, and calls to “kill more Russians” have destroyed any remaining illusions.

For the first time in years, serious people in European capitals are quietly exploring track-two contacts with Moscow.

German MEP Michael von der Schulenburg argues the western narrative of “wonder weapons” turning the tide in Ukraine is a deadly mirage. It is time for peace with Russia, not against it.

If you’re an American, then you might be getting damn tired of losing wars. I know I am. And you may be asking yourself, “Why does this keep happening?”

On the Golden Fleece podcast with Lasha Kasradze, Ambassador Matlock draws on his firsthand experience working with Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Henry Kissinger. Ambassador Matlock explains how diplomacy—not military pressure—helped end the Cold War peacefully. He argues that many of today’s geopolitical crises stem from the abandonment of those diplomatic principles.

The Pentagon is reportedly drafting a new nuclear strategy that’s expected to emphasize the use of tactical nuclear weapons to give the president more “options” in a potential nuclear conflict.

Learn how a global nuclear war would unfold and examine its potential consequences. This video explains how a war escalates if a nuclear power launches weapons, which targets are prioritized, how allies become involved, and what catastrophic effects nuclear weapons could have on both targeted locations and the whole world.

Historically, one of the greatest dangers to a major power in the international system is letting smaller allies and clients drag that power into an unwise war. Both the United States and leading European powers seem inclined to make that blunder with respect to the Baltic republics. Too many U.S. policymakers have not only tolerated but also facilitated the obsession those “allies” (i.e. protectorates) have exhibited with defeating Russia in Ukraine and weakening their arch adversary overall.

Surveying the devastation wrought by the wars in Ukraine and Iran, the Nigerian writer and former secretary general of African workers, Owei Lakemfa, concludes that “humanity is moving back to the pre-World War era when there were no agreed universal rules, might was right.” Today, writes Lakemfa, “strongmen, and nations roam around as terrorists and bandits playing God. The strongest is the Zelensky, Netanyahu, and Trump triumvirate.”^[1]

This is how the world outside of NATO and Tel Aviv sees things. This might spur a normal country run by normal people to question the wisdom of its current course. Needless to say, in 2026, the US is no such country.

Over the course of a few short weeks, a grim new reality has taken shape in Ukraine.

Ukraine becomes fault line in Italy’s next election…

This summer I and my largely Russian family, culturally and ethnically speaking, traveled to St. Petersburg to visit relatives and friends. We do this several times a year. Last summer we had a much far-ranging itinerary that included Moscow, Novorossiisk, Crimea, Sochi, and Gelendzhik in addition to St. Petersburg. The following is a series of thoughts and observations regarding this year’s July trip to Russia’ ‘northern capitol.’